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I. IN T R O D U C T IO N
Spain’s political dom inion on the American continent ended through a 
series o f  coups and battles stretching from 1809 to  1825. In som e ways, 
however, this tenaciously resisted transfer o f control was anticlimactic, 
for colonials already enjoyed a specie o f independence. As Jacques Gode- 
chot has wisely rem arked, faced with the events o f Bayonne and the 
French occupation o f the Peninsula, Spanish Americans “pensérent que 
le m om ent était venu de passer d ’une indépendence de fait a une indé- 
pendence de dro it” (G odechot 1967: 255).
Indeed, the loss o f  political sovereignty merely ratified the verdict o f 
commercial life. As the eighteenth century gave way to  the nineteenth, 
Spanish manufacturers, landowners, and merchants lost all hope of 
dom inating the N ew  W orld market. The prom ises held out by Charles 
I l l ’s trade reform s were dashed in the cycle o f  hostilities which bedeviled 
his son.
This situation should not be perceived as having been inevitable. The 
em pire could cope with war. In fact, Spanish colonial policy included con­
tingency plans designed to profit from  it, by using transient wartim e con­
ditions to  perm anently reinforce imperial interdependence. These poli­
cies, however, were m ore clever than moral. They weakened the im m ate­
rial bonds betw een ruler and ruled which were the very cem ent o f 
empire. In addition, they could no t be applied for a prolonged period, for 
the Crown could not long do w ithout colonial revenues.1
* Prof. Barbier gratefully acknowledges the financial support o f the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council o f Canada.
1 The continued dependence o f the monarchy upon patriated Indies revenues 
derived from a failure o f will. The peninsular fiscal system, despite numerous 
reform plans, was typical o f that o f Ancien Régime monarchy everywhere in 
f  urope. It remained based upon an ill-articulated series o f taxes which largely 
respected regional and estate fueros. See Barbier and Klein (l98l).
364 Jacques A . Barbier
The collapse o f  the em pire after 1808, although initiated by N apoleonic 
caprice and com pleted by Bolivarian genius, was the logical fulfilment o f 
the failure o f  Bourbon colonial trade policy. M ost particularly, it may be 
seen as a result o f  the bankruptcy o f  comercio libre and o f its wartime 
stand-ins. In a sense, Independence was a judgem ent on the trade 
reforms launched in 1765, systematized in 1778, and spread to  all corners 
o f  Spanish America in 1789.
O ne might, o f  course, choose an even broader perspective. The start of 
the industrial revolution in G reat Britain ultimately relegated Spain to 
the same econom ic status as its erstwhile colonies, doom ing the empire 
to irrelevance. This longterm  view, however, does no t further our 
understanding o f the Wars o f Independence, for the im pact o f the nas­
cent capitalist order on Latin America does not truly predate the m id­
nineteenth  century. As Tulio Halperin D onghi has po in ted  out, “the 
changes, which those who established independence thought would be 
imm ediate, were delayed alm ost fifty years” (Halperin D onghi 1973: VIII; 
Cortés C onde 1974). By that span was Independence economically p re­
mature.
In fact, Spain’s longterm  failure to becom e an industrial pow er was far 
less im portant than the underlyingly w rong-headed nature o f  Bourbon 
policy. Comercio libre was designed to create an integrated imperial econ­
omy. Those w ho im posed it were convinced that the em pire’s survival 
depended upon the forging o f material bonds between the peninsula 
and its overseas dom inions, that linguistic and cultural affinities were not 
enough. In view o f colonial loyalty during the W ar o f  Spanish Succession, 
one m ight well dispute such assum ptions. In addition, there were major 
problem s at the levels o f  policy design and im plem entation. M adrid’s 
course drove the m otherland and the Indies apart, rather than bringing 
them  together.
The im plem entation o f comercio libre (and o f its extensions) dislocated 
econom ic life and fom ented discontent, discontent which was ultimately 
to  nourish the fires o f  Independence. As to  policy design, its true nature 
can only be grasped if one understands the special role which Spain 
assigned to comercio neutral. Indeed, as will be shown, an evaluation o f the 
neutral flags’ trade leads to the inescapable conclusion that it was an in te­
gral part o f  commercial policy, and no t a desperate wartime expedient. 
Through it, Spain sought to  reap surreptitious advantage from colonial 
misery; conspiring with its own enemies to  achieve in secret, policy 
objectives which it dared no t embrace in public. In short, as an ensemble,
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comercio libre and comercio neutral did no t constitute a firm base for a satis­
factory policy. They were a recipe for dissent and struggle.
In any event, the Spanish Bourbons failed. W hen the dynasty was uncer­
em oniously rem oved from its th rone in 1808, the em pire was no t bound 
together by a finely articulated economy, one binding metrópoli and ultra­
mar in to  a harm onious whole. Colonial restlessness, exacerbated by 
predatory trade policies, was but insufficiently restrained by economic 
interdependence. In the pages which follow, I hope to docum ent the 
predatory nature o f these policies, and show how  their enforced aban­
donm ent during a period o f prolonged war actually reduced in terdepend­
ence. Indeed, the major contention o f  this w ork is that am bitions and cir­
cumstances conspired together to give Spain the w orst o f bo th  possible 
worlds.
II. CO M ER CIO  NEUTRAL: W ARTIME CO M ER CIO  LIBRE
Bourbon trade policy failed rather abruptly; unlike that o f the Hapsburgs, 
whose agony was prolonged. This failure, o f  course, was directly related 
to  Charles IV’s decision to  go to  war with G reat Britain in 1796, and to 
resum e that struggle in 1804. Up to the onset o f this cycle o f  conflicts, 
comercio libre had fulfilled many o f  its prom ises.2 T here is even reason to 
believe that the colonial elites had begun to  adapt to the new commercial 
order.
Yet hostilities, o f  themselves, did no t inherently imply Spanish com m er­
cial ruin, for Madrid had fall-back plans. It relied upon its fleet, which may 
have been the second largest in the world in 1796 (Barbier 1984a). It 
depended upon formal comercio neutral, decreed by the K ing him self and 
em bodying som e very real protection  for peninsular trading interests. 
Lastly, w here strategic considerations left it no o ther viable choice, Ma­
drid was prepared to approve a bewildering series o f local options, each 
designed to  regularize recourse to foreign flag vessels and ports. Given 
the very difficult circumstances o f  the late eighteenth century, the Crown 
was prepared to approve w hatever was required to supply its dom inions 
and maintain commercial ties between Spain and its colonies.
T he monarchy, o f  course, never expected that its fleet w ould sweep that 
o f G reat Britain from the high seas. Instead, a fleet-in-being strategy was
2 The recent works o fjo h n  Fisher and Javier Cuenca are instructive in that regard.
See Cuenca Esteban (1981) and Fisher (1981).
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followed. The armada was to  prevent effective blockade, by forcing Brit­
ish forces to remain concentrated. Occasional convoys to  major ports 
w ould sustain comercio libre, albeit at a much reduced level. M ost im por­
tantly, neutral flag vessels were to  slip through the interstices o f Spanish 
convoys and British blockaders.
It is im portant to  understand that these contingency plans were not 
desperate wartim e expedients, but part and parcel o f  the trade policies o f 
colonial reform ers; tim e-honored and well thought out solutions, which 
grasped for whatever advantages were to  be had from  difficult problem s 
and impossible weakness. Alien vessels were essential to colonial trade in 
the Wars o f Spanish and Austrian Succession. W ith a revival o f Spanish 
naval strength, a multi-faceted policy, still featuring a substantial role for 
foreign flag vessels, sustained trade during the W ar o f American Inde­
pendence. It m ight have done so in subsequent conflicts, as well, had it 
no t been for the virtual collapse o f the allied French navy.
Again, these measures were an extension o f  policy, and not an exception 
to  it. G iven the frequency o f international conflict during the Old 
Regime, a trade policy which was effective only in peacetim e would have 
been mere opportunism . Thus, the success o f comercio libre can properly 
be judged on the basis o f  Spain’s wartime commercial experience. If  the 
fleet and neutral ships, together or by themselves, could not safeguard 
the achievements o f  the Caroline reforms, then these rested on no secure 
foundation.
As is well know n the fleet failed. D enied effective French support, the 
armada w ent dow n to disastrous defeat at the Battle o f  Cape St. Vincent 
(February 14,1797). From that po in t on, only recourse to  neutral vessels 
could solve M adrid’s colonial trade problem s and, unlike in the previous 
war with G reat Britain, these ships would have to  do the job alone.
1. The First Phase, 1797-1799
In 1796, at the start o f Charles IV’s first conflict w ith G reat Britain, M a­
drid was convinced that recourse to  neutral flag vessels was the only 
viable means o f keeping trade routes open. There were two ways, 
however, in which such a scheme could be im plem ented. The first was to 
allow local officials to  open their ports, if  they saw the need. It was 
understood  that they would be tem pted to do so, to  obtain vitally need­
ed supplies (particularly if  these were o f a military nature), or to  secure 
revenues for colonial coffers. Similarly, wise as the governm ent had
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becom e in the ways o f  Indies politics, it took for granted that the gover­
nors o f  tropical colonies w ould open their ports to foreigners, even if 
ordered not to do so. The influence o f the local land-holding elite, which 
needed to  sell its products overseas, tended to be too strong in such 
places to  allow any other result.3
T he second option was for Madrid itself to license the trade o f neutral 
flag vessels: which could sail from Spain, o ther European countries, or 
neutral American ports, depending upon the formula chosen by Spanish 
policy makers. This tended to be preferred to  the first option, which left 
open the danger that all central control o f commercial policy w ould be 
lost. In addition, the Crown harbored the hope that direct licensing 
would allow peninsular merchants, and particularly those o f  Cádiz (who 
were well-connected abroad), to  continue to  participate in the overseas 
trade.
W eighing the alternatives, the Ministry o f  Finance, which was respon­
sible for trade policy, decided to license comercio neutral from Europe and 
discourage direct trade with foreign colonies. A t the same time, however, 
it resolved to quietly provide exem ptions as regards the latter, to  such 
governors as m ight be forced by local pressures to  allow trade with 
neighboring alien ports. The expectation was that comercio neutral would 
suffice for the three oldest viceroyalties, but that Caribbean and South 
Atlantic possessions would dem and comercio de cambio de frutos con colonias 
extranjeras.
These measures are not to be in terpreted as stopgap expedients. The 
C row n’s experience, since the start o f  the War o f Spanish Succession, 
show ed that wartim e com merce by licensed foreigners w ould inevitably 
be followed by substantial grow th in Spanish trade once peace was re­
stored. In this light comercio neutral was a wartim e corollary o f comercio 
libre. The connection can be clearly made at the policy-maker level. At the 
start o f the first conflict w ith G reat Britain, Francisco de Saavedra, at that 
tim e a m em ber o f  the Council o f War, advised the Crown that wartim e 
im ports o f cheap foreign goods bankrupted Spanish American indus­
tries, and thereby cleared the way for deeper peacetim e penetration o f 
colonial markets by peninsular manufacturers. As M inister o f  Finance, 
Saavedra was the individual who subsequently authorized comercio neu­
tral'.4
3 This discussion is based on Barbier (1980). Relevant documents were found in 
AGI, Indiferente, leg. 2466.
4 Saavedra had distinguished credentials as a reformer. He served in the Ministry o f
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The original im plem entation o f these policies, although slowed by the 
need to justify everything to  Godoy, was relatively straightforward. The 
Crown began by allowing im portation o f flour, cod and o ther basic items 
from foreign sources, through neutral ports, and using alien vessels.5 On 
N ovem ber 18, 1797, comercio neutral was legalized and soon afterwards 
Caribbean colonies, such as Cuba and Venezuela, were given perm ission 
to  engage in comercio de cambio de frutos con colonias extranjeras,6 In fact, of 
course, many Antillean ports were already wide open to foreign flag ves­
sels.
M inister o f Finance Saavedra, defending his policy to  Godoy, po in ted  out 
that Spain’s effective authority was limited. It could not prevent its Carib­
bean and South Atlantic possessions from  trading with nearby neutral 
colonies and w ith the U nited States:
Es cierto, que este partido no pueden adoptarlo Nueva España, Sta.Fé y el Perú que 
son por la mayor parte provincias mediterráneas, pero alli toman otro peor, y es 
que se acostumbran a pasarlo sin los generos de la metrópoli, establecen fábricas o 
plantíos que los suplen y que ya proveen [...] la mayor parte de las necesidades 
populares de aquellos países; siendo esta, a mi ver, la principal causa del cortísimo 
tráfico de España respecto a la dilatada superficie y aún de la población de sus 
dominios de Indias, y que no solo perjudica a los intereses de la m etrópoli sino que 
conspira lentamente a la independencia.7
If  colonial autarchy was to  be com bated, so was the natural tendency o f 
American territories to develop symbiotic relationships w ith each other:
Quando se pesan las ventajas o inconvenientes de los varios medios de proveer 
nuestras Americas en tiempo de guerra, no se debe establecer el paralelo entre el 
comercio que se haga desde nuestros puertos y el que se execute desde los neu­
trales, porque el primero es imposible [...] sino entre el que se puede hacer desde 
los puertos neutrales por cuenta de Españoles y con retornos a España; o el que se 
esta haciendo inevitablemente entre nuestras posesiones y las extranjeras de Indias 
con absoluta independencia de la metrópoli.8
Again, comercio neutral was a tw o-edged sword. It was designed to prevent 
the developm ent o f manufacturing (and o f  specialized agriculture com-
the Indies underjosé de Gálvez, who selected him to serve as his personal envoy 
(comisario regio) in the Caribbean area during the War of the American Indepen­
dence. He v ( > subsequently named intendente o f Caracas. After a term as minister 
of finances, lie served as foreign minister, and was therefore first minister o f the 
Crown.
5 AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2193; México, leg. 1586; Indiferente, legs. 535 and 2466.
6 AGI, Indiferente, legs. 535 and 2466.
7 AGI, Indiferente, leg. 2467.
8 Ibid.
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petitive with that o f  the peninsula) in the core viceroyalties, and to  limit 
ties with foreign colonies in the rapidly growing peripheral zones. If we 
are to evaluate the success o f the policy, it m ust be in term s o f these 
objectives.
It m ust be adm itted, however, that there is but scant basis for evaluating 
this success. The statistical inform ation which would allow it is simply 
n o t available. N onetheless, the qualitative evidence is fairly straightfor­
ward. In Cuba, comercio neutral was never m ore than a supplem ent to 
o ther means o f access to  foreign ships, goods and markets, dow n to 1808 
and beyond.9 In Venezuela, the colonial governm ent’s tobacco trading 
contracts with Ekard and Co. o f  St. Thom as and Robinson, Philips and 
Corser o f Curaçao, tended to negate the im portance o f  comercio neutral, at 
least dow n to 1805 (Barbier 1981: 473). Elsewhere in South America, the 
situation varied. The first wave o f neutral trade did not have a significant 
impact on Callao or Cartagena. T he one area where it did was the River 
Plate.
Table 1
Ships Reported to Have Arrived in M ontevideo Under the Real Orden 
o f November 18, 1797, as per Viceregal Report o f December 24, 1798
Name Nationality Origin Destination
“Infanta” Spanish Cádiz Havana
“Misericordia” Genoese Cádiz Havana
“Magdalena” Spanish Cádiz Havana
“Ciudad” Genoese Cádiz Havana
“Concepcion” Genoese Cádiz Havana
“Libertad” Genoese Cádiz Havana
“Rosario” Genoese Cádiz Cádiz
“Turaceny” Turkish Barcelona Barcelona
“Hidra” Turkish Barcelona Barcelona
“M aysgoodhope” Danish Cádiz Hamburg
“Diana” U.S. Baltimore In Port
“Patriota” U.S. Philadelphia In Port
‘Juana” U.S. Philadelphia In Port
“Zephirus” Danish Málaga In Port
“Troverdige” Danish Málaga In Port
“Dhevithevos” Hamburg Hamburg In Port
“Diana” U.S. Philadelphia In Port
Source: AGI, Buenos Aires, leg. 125.
9 A pioneering work on this era isCoatsworth (1967). On the subject in general, and 
on the specific role of Cuba, see the studies o f Cuenca Esteban, Salvucci, Barbier, 
and Kuethe — all in Barbier and Kuethe (1984).
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In Buenos Aires, the situation was rather different, for the foreign 
response was im m ediate and massive (see Table l). Foreign flag vessels 
kept Barcelona and Cadiz’s export trade with the River Plate temporarily 
open, and sustained the A rgentine-Cuban link o f  the triangular trade. At 
the same tim e, however, comercio neutral also brought in ships from  the 
U nited States and Europe, ships destined to  fom ent further the export o f 
Platine products.
It should be noted that any attem pt to evaluate the econom ic im portance 
o f  comercio neutral runs into a num ber o f docum entary problem s. The 
names and cargoes o f  foreign vessels in Spanish colonial harbors are not 
com plete, they are not necessarily accurately given, and it is not always 
clear if indentified vessels are truly o f the comercio neutral o r if they are 
foreign flag ships which are in harbor on another basis. These remarks 
apply to  the entire course o f the trade.
In any event this early wave o f neutral trade came to an early and abrupt 
end. O n April 20,1799, the Consulado o f Cádiz convinced the Monarch, 
through M inister o f State Mariano Luis de Urquijo, to w ithdraw  the or­
ders allowing comercio neutral.1"
This reversal, which was the result o f  the near-sighted self-interest o f 
Cádiz merchants, simply threw  open even w ider the doors o f  contraband, 
special licenses, and comercio de cambio de frutos con colonias extranjeras. As 
to  the Consulado’s alternative solution, trade by means o f  small Spanish 
vessels (nam ed, in unconscious irony, místicos), it proved a dismal failure. 
They were run dow n by British cruisers, sunk by the violent waters o f  the 
Atlantic and Caribbean, and their minuscle loads m ade no impact on the 
colonial markets.
2. The Second Phase, 1801-1802
Comercio neutral resum ed in 1801. T he C row n’s hand was forced by two 
considerations: its inability to  p revent colonies such as Cuba and Vene­
zuela from trading with the U nited States and o ther alien American terri­
tories; and the need to reopen trade routes, so as to allow the patriation 
o f Indies funds via bills-of-exchange transactions (Barbier 1980: 30-31). 
M adrid’s financial problem s m ade the latter a peculiarly im portant 
m otive in the form ulation o f royal trade policy (Barbier and Klein 1981). 
The new scheme was complex, as it com prised both licenses sold by the
10 AGI, Consulados, libro 97; Indiferente, legs. 2466 and 2467.
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treasury as per a printed fee schedule, and other perm its granted to court 
figures and the well-connected in com pensation for obligations the 
monarchy could no longer meet. In bo th  cases, however, financial consid­
erations counted m ore than econom ic ones.
For Buenos Aires, the results are roughly indicated in Table 2. Com pared 
to the situation described in 1798, the failure o f comercio neutral seems 
obvious, for no change in the average size o f vessels was noted. In fact, 
however, a great num ber o f foreign vessels legally entered Buenos Aires 
and M ontevideo, w ithout being considered ships o f comercio neutral. 
Some were allowed in, like the American “Christina”in 1798, because they 
were engaged in comercio libre de negros — and blacks were no t the only 
goods legally carried aboard such vessels.11 These ships could then be 
used for trade between Spanish colonies, as was the “A ssum ption”, a 
U nited States ship reputedly sold to  Tomás A ntonio Rom ero and sent to 
Havana.12 Ships o f the comercio libre de negros could also be dispatched to 
foreign ports.T hus in 1803, the “Barbara” sailed from M ontevideo to  Bor­
deaux, with hides and silver. As the Viceroy explained, this was allowed 
as the ship was extracting the value o f blacks previously im ported as al­
lowed by the R.O. o f  1799 regulating this traffic, “siendo muy frecuentes 
y muy considerables los que salen directam ente para diversos puertos
Table 2
Ships o f Comercio Neutral in the River Plate, 1801-1802
Year Ship Name Nationality Licensee or Organizer
1801 “W ilm ington” U.S.
1801 “Molly” U.S. Manuel de Almagro1
1801 “Gallant” U.S.
1801 “Judit” Portuguese 
Spanish (?)21801 “S.Jose”
1801 “Maria” U.S.5 Viuda de Laiglesia
1802 “Molly” U.S.
1802 “Bonafides” Hamburg D. o f Osuna
1802 “De W iteros” Hamburg Brentano4
1802 “Elena” Danish Brentano4
1 Brother o f the Assessor General o f the viceroyalty.
2 Arrived from Philadelphia.
3 Arrived from Cádiz.
4 Brentano, Bovara & Urbieta, merchants o f Hamburg.
Sources: AGI, Buenos Aires, legs. 127, 129, and 130; Indiferente, leg. 2492.
11 AGI, Buenos Aires, leg. 124.
12 Ibid.
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extrangeros.”13 A nother example is provided by the U.S. ship “W ashing­
to n ”, hired by the C ount o f  Liniers (b rother o f the future viceroy), which 
came in in ballast to take out the proceeds o f  his slave sales.14 
To this one m ust add the comercio de cambio de frutos con colonias extranjeras, 
which could also legally serve as a means o f acquiring “strategic” Euro­
pean goods.15 This latter type o f trade attracted Spanish vessels, bu t could 
also involve the ships o f the European colony in question. Thus in the 
years o f Charles IV’s first war with G reat Britain, neutral Portuguese ves­
sels, no t classified as engaged in comercio neutral, could nevertheless trade 
in the River Plate.16 In addition, captains o f  foreign ships bringing in offi­
cial mail (in Buenos Aires as elsewhere in Spanish America) could expect 
to  receive licenses to  trade in recom pense for their exertions.17 These 
legal expedients joined the quasi-legal and contraband schemes 
em ployed in the River Plate, schemes well-known through the w orks o f 
various historians, and particularly o f  Sergio Villalobos (1965). O n the 
whole, the second phase o f  the first British war saw the u tte r bankruptcy 
o f  Spain’s contingency plans. In the Río de la Plata, formal comercio neutral 
was alm ost irrelevant, even as the ships using that formula began to 
penetrate Callao and Cartagena.18
3. The Third Phase, 1804-1808
W ith the tem porary return o f peace in 1802, Madrid yearned to return to 
mercantilistic rigor. This proved to be impossible to achieve, however, 
for the licenses granted to such as the D uke o f Osuna, Frutos de Alvaro 
Benito, and the Marquess o f  Bedmar were still being honored in the last 
m onths o f  peace in 1804 (see Table 3, for Buenos Aires).
T he resum ption o f  war and o f  neutral trade were bo th  decreed in 
D ecem ber o f  1804. The new  comercio neutral operated on streamlined 
principles, o f  course. Sauve quipeut now properly characterized M adrid’s 
attitude, it no longer insisted upon mercantilistic niceties. All restrictions 
as to  the num ber o f  vessels or type o f  goods were waived, and the trade 
was treated for custom s purposes as if it passed trough Spanish ports. All
13 AGI, Buenos Aires, leg. 131.
14 AGI, Buenos Aires, leg. 134.
15 AGI, Buenos Aires, leg. 127.
16 AGI, Buenos Aires, legs. 126, 127, and 215.
17 AGI, Buenos Aires, leg. 129.
18 AGI, San te Fe, leg. 648; and Lima, leg. 720.
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Table 3
Ships o f Comercio Neutral in the River Plate, 1804-1808
Ship Name Nationality Licensee and/or Organizer
“Yenne” Hamburg D. o f Osuna/Brentano1
“Die Freundschaft” Hamburg
Danish2
D. o f  Osuna
‘Johana Adriana” F. de Alvaro Benito
“W itte Vojs” Danish3 F. de Alvaro Benito/Brentano
“Massachusetts” U.S. Julian Hernández Barruso
“Ana” Unknown M. of Bedmar/del Pont4
“Favius” U.S. Julian Hernández Barruso
“Isabel” U.S.5 Thomas O ’Reilly
“Flor del D ouro” Portuguese del Pont
“Esperanza” Portuguese José Antonio Pereyra
“Bashaw” U.S. Gilmore6
“Mary” U.S. Ferrer, Tastet/Gilmore7
“Patty” U.S. John Craig and others
“Bauer” Danish Brentano
“Santa Maria” Portuguese8 Ferrer, Tastet
“Amalia Isabel” U.S. Thomas O ’Reilly9
“Friede” Hamburg Thomas O ’Reilly
“Herald” U.S. Thomas O ’Reilly10
“Maria” U.S. Thomas O ’Reilly
1 This is the firm o f Brentano, Bovara & Urbieta.
2 Sailed from Tönning (Slesvik).
3 Sailed from Friedrichstadt (Slesvik).
4 Ventura Miguel Marcó del Pont.
5 Sailed from Lisbon.
6 Robert Gilmore and Sons.
7 The bill o f lading issued in the United States specified that the interest parties 
were LeRoy Bayard and McEver; Archibald Grade; John Craig; and John 
Oliver. Gilmore may simply have owned the ship.
8 Sailed to Copenhagen.
9 Sailed to England. Consignee was G ordon and Murphy.
10 Sailed to Baltimore.
Sources: AGI, Buenos Aires, legs. 137, 138, and 139; Indiferente, legs. 1702, 2468, 
2470, 2471, 2472, and 2492; Ultramar, legs. 742, 839, 840, and 841.
was arranged in such a way as to maximize revenues, and w ithout consid­
ering the econom ic impact on the peninsula and the Indies o f the new 
measures. In addition to  the sale o f new licenses, the Crown rehabilitated 
all the old ones, and entered into special arrangem ents with foreign com ­
panies — such as the French banking firm o f O uvrard, and the m erchant 
houses o f  Reid, Irving and Co. and G ordon, M urphy and Co. Lastly, in 
som e cases, the Caja de Consolidación de Vales Reales acquired a dom inant, 
privileged position.
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For South America som e statistical results can be set out, although the 
results are probably incom plete, and nothing can be said about the 
volum e o f trade. In the River Plate (see Table 3), comercio neutral contin­
ued during the inter-war period, and beyond. It is evident that American 
(o r British?) names became m ore dom inant w ith time, although German 
and Danish vessels tended to be larger than American ones. In any event, 
the situation was unstable due to  political changes in N orthern  Germany 
and to  the American em bargo o f  1807. The interested parties in the trade, 
here as elsewhere in South America, are difficult to  determ ine. As best as 
one can tell, the D uke o f  O suna did not always sell his licenses, som e­
times he traded on his own — w ith disastrous results. In m ost instances, 
however, Spanish merchants w ere but front m en for foreign ones, and 
the interrelations betw een these latter were far from simple. W hat, for 
instance was the true relationship betw een Thom as O ’Reilly and G or­
don and Murphy? Still, one is left w ith the im pression that what-
Table 4
Neutral Trade in Callao, 1804-1808
Ship Name Nationality Firm Responsible
“Anseática” Hamburg Geoffroy/Rucker1
Brentano2“Despacho” U.S.
“Juan Parish” Hamburg Brentano2
“W ilhelmsburg” Hamburg Brentano2
“Cesar & Peter” Hamburg Unknown
“San Jose’ Portuguese J. A. Pereira5
“Amelia” Unknown C. o f Premio Real4
“Monticello” U.S. Gordon & Murphy4 
Bandeira/M ontano5“Waldemar” Danish
“Bons Irmao” Portuguese Thomas O ’Gorman
“Cordelia” U.S. Unknown
1 The firms involved are those of P. Geoffroy & Sons and Rucker and 
Westphalen.
2 The firm is that o f Brentano, Bovara & Urbieta; all ships left from Hamburg.
3 Ship left from Lisbon.
4 Ship left from Cádiz.
5 The firms involved are those o f Jacinto Fernandez Bandeira and Jose Ventura 
M ontano; the ship left from Lisbon.
The above list is undoubtedly incomplete. Thus the “Hermosa Mexicana”, despite its 
name, may well have been a foreign ship. In addition, the nationality o f the “Antilope” 
is unknown, as are the circumstances o f its voyage; and it is not known if the 
“Triunfo” reached the Pacific.
Sources: AGI, Ultramar, legs. 640,742, 839, 840, and 841; Indiferente, legs. 1702, 
2472, and 2827; Lima, leg. 736; and Santo Domingo, leg. 2207.
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Table 5
Neutral Trade in Cartagena de Indias, 1804-1808
Ship Name Nationality Firm Port
“Wilhelm & Albert” Danish Van Heiningen Altona
‘Juana Adriana” Hamburg V. Lienau (?) Hamburg
“Nueva Aurora” Portuguese Fernandes de Silva O porto
“Henry” Danish Gordon & Murphy Cádiz
“Maria” Danish G ordon & Murphy Cádiz
“Lesbia” ( is t) Danish Gordon & Murphy Cádiz
“Lesbia” (2nd) Danish Gordon & Murphy Cádiz
Source: AGI, Ultramar, legs. 742, 839, and 840; Indiferente, legs. 2470, 2471, and 
2472; Santa Fe, legs. 653 and 956.
ever the answers to such questions comercio neutral did not regain its prior 
im portance for the Platine region.
T he same cannot be said for Callao (see Table 4) and Cartagena (see Table 
5). For bo th  ports, the influx o f legal foreign goods was unprecedented. 
T he num ber o f alien ships arriving legally, and the size o f these vessels, 
w ould seem to imply a powerful impact on the local economy. This is 
particularly true for the G ordon and M urphy voyages, which enjoyed 
such privileges as to  make them  little m ore than legalized sacking opera­
tions.
Again, as in the case o f Buenos Aires, it is often difficult to  determ ine 
w ho were the true owners o f  the trade.Thus, the M. Van Fieiningen &Co. 
which sent the “W ilhelm and A lbert” under a Danish flag from the Duchy 
o f  Holstein to  Cartagena, was in fact a H am burg firm. But it seems to 
have been dependent on the D utch m erchant-banking house o f  Ed. 
Croese & Co. (who were am ong the principal money lenders to  the Span­
ish Crow n). The Germ an com pany suspended paym ents at the same 
tim e as its D utch counterpart in early 1806. In dealing with this trade, one 
often has the im pression that one is fighting w ith shadows.
The picture presented  by the comercio neutral o f La Guaira and Puerto 
Cabello is, perhaps, the m ost dramatic (see Table 6). In Venezuela, w ith 
but a few exceptions, a single firm temporarily m onopolized trade from 
late 1805 through 1807. Philadelphia m erchant John  Craig, thanks to a 
partnership with the Caja de Consolidación de Vales Reales, managed to 
com pletely dom inate the foreign com merce o f  the greater part o f  the 
colony until after the onset o f  the American embargo. N onetheless, by 
1808, Venezuela also offers a couple o f  examples o f  how neutral trade 
should have been made to work. I refer to the expeditions carried o u t in 
the name o f Juan Francisco Barrie, a French industrialist established in
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Galicia w ho, in partnership with U nited States merchants, attem pted to 
sell the hats produced in his peninsular factory in the colonies. To add 
in terest to  his venture, o f course, he also dealt in other goods. Or, at least, 
so it seems.
Table 6
Neutral Trade, La Guaira and Puerto Cabello, 1805-1808
Ship Name Nationality Port
“Cometa” U.S. Philadelphia
“Activa” U.S. Philadelphia
“Maria” Danish St. Thomas
“Rambler” Danish St. Thomas
“Jensen” Danish St. Thomas
“Tiby” Danish St. Thomas
“Esther” Danish St. Thomas
“Madame Kerversan”1 French Martinique
“Randi” Danish St. Croix
“Pamela” U.S. Charleston/Philadelphia
“Cosm opolita” Danish St. Thomas
“Brilliant” U.S. Baltimore
“Eliza” Danish St. Thomas
“Elizabeth” U.S. New York
“H ippona” U.S. St. Thomas
“Reunion” French Martinique
“Tres Amigos”2 U.S. To Baltimore
“W altuslaft” (?) Danish Unknown
“Endim ion” U.S. To Philadelphia
“Forsegen” (?) Danish St. Thomas
“A ntelope” Unknown Baltimore
“Margarita” U.S. Philadelphia
“Juana” Danish St. Croix
“SpeedewiU” U.S. Philadelphia
“Fox” Danish St. Thomas
“Resolution” U.S. Philadelphia
“Felicidad” U.S. Beverley (Mass.)
“Dos Hermanas” U.S. Beverley (Mass.)
“Forsoguel” (?) Danish St. Thomas
“Oliva” U.S. New York
“Farmen” U.S. Philadelphia
“Brute” Dutch Curaçao
“Isabella” Swedish St. Bartholemew
“Tam Fam” Danish St. Thomas/Philadelphia
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Table 6 (Cont.)
Ship Name Nationality Port
“Esperanza”2 U.S. Baltimore
“Torreger” (?) Danish St. Thomas
“S. Antonio”3 Portuguese Spain (unspecified)
“U nion”4 U.S. Salem (Mass.)/La Coruña
“Georgetown”5 U.S. Philadelphia/La Coruña
Save as noted, all voyages were for John Craig o f Philadelphia.
1 Made two voyages.
2 Ship o f Luke Tiernan.
3 Ship of F. M. and J. E. Montano.
4 Ship o f j .  F. Barrie and Juan Leamy.
5 Ship o f j .  F. Barrie and R. Wain.
Sources: AGI, Caracas, leg. 487; Ultramar, legs. 742 , 8 3 9 , 840, and 841; 
Indiferente, legs. 2470, 2471, and 2473.
III. C O N C L U SIO N
It is difficult to  be definitive about the economic impact o f comercio neu­
tral. W ithou t m ore inform ation than we presently have on neutral trade 
volum es, price levels in Spanish America and the fate o f  certain Indies 
industries, we cannot rise very far above the level o f speculation. It does 
seem likely that the policy contributed in 1804-1808 to  the greater in te­
gration o f Peru and New G ranada into the world m arket economy, but 
this should no t be exaggerated. Its effect on Venezuela, in the same 
period was to  temporarily reintroduce m onopoloy. Elsewhere, and at 
o ther times, things are less clear.
In any event, it may well be that the true im portance o f comercio neutral 
was m ore political than economic. T hat the policy should have been con­
ceived o f  at all, in the kind o f anti-Spanish American term s in which it 
was form ulated, speaks volumes about M adrid’s attitudes tow ards its 
colonies in the waning years o f the em pire — which may help account for 
the grow th o f  pro-independence feelings. T hat it should have been 
scuttled so quickly by Cádiz interests in its first incarnation reveals that 
reform ism no longer enjoyed the support it had com m anded in the past. 
T hat it should have been revived as a revenues producing scheme, tells us 
much about the M onarchy’s desperation. Lastly, that it should be so diffi­
cult to  identify the true beneficiaries o f the trading voyages may suggest 
som ething about the world capitalist order, which was to dom inate 
South America by the m id-nineteenth century.
